









Inside	 or	 outside	 of	 the	 legal	 world,	 for	 most	 people,	 Enron,1	
Madoff,2	and	Theranos3	 all	 conjure	up	 images	of	 investor	 fraud,	white	





Jacob	 Elberg—few	 others	 would	 appreciate	 spirited	 discussions	 on	 the	 contours		
between	incrementalism	and	induction.	










all	 three	 actors	 listed—their	 managers,	 subsidies,	 and	 sometimes	 brothers—but	 all	
included	 claims	 under	 the	 Securities	 and	 Exchange	 Act	 of	 1934,	 15	 U.S.C.	 §	 78j	 (“§	
10(b)”).		Press	Release,	Sec.	&	Exch.	Comm’n,	SEC	Charges	Kenneth	L.	Lay,	Enron’s	Former	
Chairman	 and	 Chief	 Executive	 Officer,	 with	 Fraud	 and	 Insider	 Trading	 (July	 8,	 2004),	





LLC	 with	 violations	 including	 §	 10(b)	 and	 Rule	 10b-5);	 Press	 Release,	 Sec.	 &	 Exch.	
Comm’n,	SEC	Charges	Peter	Madoff	with	Fraud	and	False	Statements	to	Regulators	(June	
29,	 2012),	 https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2012-2012-126htm	 (charging	







ethical,	 psychological,	 and	moral	 concerns.	 	 Some	have	 contemplated	







Willful	 fraud,	 and	 the	 mindsets	 behind	 it,	 may	 grab	 significant	
public	 attention,	 but	 a	more	 elusive	 psychological	 phenomenon	may	
lurk	behind	a	broad	swath	of	securities	actions:	cognitive	dissonance.		
Cognitive	dissonance,	a	process	by	which	an	actor	can	subconsciously	
deceive	 herself	 about	 the	 quality	 and	 effect	 of	 her	 actions,	 differs	
significantly	from	willful	fraud:	the	actor	may	not	comprehend	the	scope	
or	trajectory	of	her	conduct.8		Understanding	cognitive	dissonance	may	
offer	 insight	 to	 increasing	 the	 law’s	 effectiveness	 as	 a	 deterrent	 and	
providing	 counsel	 a	 better	 understanding	 of	 their	 clients’	 actions	 to	
advise	prospectively	and	retrospectively.		Some	scholars	have	suggested	






With	 an	 average	 of	 $6	 billion	 in	 settlements	 per	 year10	 and	
estimates	 of	 psychopathy	 in	 the	 general	 population	 at	 under	 one	
 
	 5	 Alan	 Deutschman,	 Is	 Your	 Boss	 a	 Psychopath?,	 FASTCOMPANY	 (July	 1,	 2005),	
https://www.fastcompany.com/53247/your-boss-psychopath	 (Dr.	 Hare	 suggests,	
indirectly,	 that	 the	 CFO	 of	 Enron,	 Andrew	 Fastow,	 exhibits	 psychopathic	 behavior);	
Diana	 B.	 Henriques,	 Letters	 from	 a	 Sociopath,	 FORBES	 (Mar.	 21,	 2012,	 6:00	 PM),	
https://www.forbes.com/forbes/2012/0409/feature-bernie-madoff-prison-rewrite-
letters-from-sociopath.html#666235803167	 (an	 article	 about	 the	 correspondence	
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$6	 billion	 in	 settlements	 per	 year.12	 	 The	 scale	 here	 prompts	 an	
important	 question:	 Is	 there	 truly	 an	 incredible	 correlation	 between	




















however	much	 those	 numbers	may	 vary,	 they	 do	 not	 represent	 a	majority	 of	 these	
instances	 of	 securities	 violations.	 See	 Karen	 Landay,	Psychopaths	 in	 the	 C-Suite?,	 AM.	
PSYCHOLOGICAL	 ASS’N	 (Oct.	 15,	 2018),	 https://www.apa.org/pubs/highlights/
spotlight/issue-123	 (stating	 that	 “the	 results	 do	not	 support	 the	 idea	 that	 corporate	
leaders	tend	to	have	substantially	higher	 levels	of	psychopathic	 tendencies”).	But	see	




	 14	 LaCroix,	 infra	 note	 201;	 see	 also	 SECURITIES	 CLASS	 ACTION	 FILINGS,	 2019	 YEAR	 IN	
REVIEW,	 CORNERSTONE	RSCH.	 1	 (2020),	 https://www.cornerstone.com/Publications/Re-




SECURITIES	 CLASS	 ACTION	 FILINGS	 IN	 LIFE	 SCIENCES	 SECTOR,	 IN	 VIVO	 2	 (2020),	 https://
www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/rise-securities-class-actions-life-sciences.	
	 15	 Nicki	Locker	&	Laurie	B.	Smilan,	2019	Life	Sciences	Securities	Litigation	Roundup,	




Drug	 Administration	 (FDA)16	 for	 approvals,	 life	 science	 companies—
and	 their	 managers—are	 beholden	 to	 a	 strange	 array	 of	 deadlines,	
inspections,	 and	 notifications	 that	 ultimately	 makes	 or	 breaks	 the	
business.17	 	Determining	when	and	how	to	notify	investors	presents	a	
myriad	of	ethical	and,	ultimately,	legal	dilemmas.18		
The	 failure	 to	 disclose	 material	 changes	 to	 investors,	 either	
through	 misrepresentations	 or	 omissions,	 is	 a	 significant	 trigger	 for	
class	action	suits	in	this	sector.		Under	the	Securities	and	Exchange	Act	





surrounding	 the	 disclosures	 managers	 and	 directors	 make	 to	 assess	
whether	 they	 have	 the	 requisite	 scienter.20	 	 The	 general	 internal	




to	 the	 effect	 of	 an	 FDA	 notice,	 it	 is	 frequently	 a	 more	 complicated,	
convoluted	web	of	ego,	confusion,	 loyalty,	and	bravado	that	plays	out	
between	 a	 variety	 of	 key	 corporate	 players.	 	 Where,	 exactly,	 the	
manager—or	managers—cross	the	line	into	the	requisite	scienter	is	not	











or	 any	 securities-based	 swap	 agreement[,]	 any	manipulative	 or	 deceptive	 device	 or	
















opposing	 facts,	 and,	 therefore,	 the	 brain	 seeks	 to	 eliminate	 this	
differential.25		The	discomfort	created	by	dissonance	is	a	driving	force,	
like	 hunger,	 that	 motivates	 an	 individual	 to	 seek	 resolution	 to	 the	
discrepancy;	 that	 resolution	 is	 called	 consonance.26	 	 Dissonance	 is	
eliminated	by	 (1)	 discarding	 old	 information	or	 (2)	 distinguishing	 or	
rejecting	new	facts.27		This	process	occurs	regularly	and	is	an	essential	
mental	 tool	 for	 organizing	 new	 information.28	 	 Typically,	 the	 process	
resolves	by	 leaving	the	 individual	 in	 internal	consonance	and	relative	





The	more	 complex	 the	 new	 information	may	 be	 and	 the	 smaller	 the	
objective	 difference	 between	 the	 dissonant	 facts,	 the	 easier	 it	 is	 to	















material	 facts	 about	 their	 environment,	 task,	 or	 conduct.	 	 For	 a	 discussion	 about		
eliminating	dissonance,	see	id.	at	5.	

























Rather	 than	 looking	 at	 how	 cognitive	 dissonance	 can	 enable	
prolonged	victimization,	by	affecting	the	victim,	this	Comment	will	turn	
towards	 how	 cognitive	 dissonance	 can	 play	 a	 role	 in	 the	 wrongful	





Public	 life	 sciences	 companies	 have	 a	 duty	 to	 make	 disclosures	
under	 the	 SEA,	 and	 that	 duty	 includes	 refraining	 from	 omitting	
necessary	material	 facts.35	 	 But	 determining	 the	 timing	 and	 scope	 of	























the	 hurdles	 cognitive	 dissonance	 places	 in	 front	 of	 relevant	 clients.		
Changes	 to	both	 securities	 laws	and	FDA	 regulations	 should	 take	 the	
potential	 for	 cognitive	 dissonance	 into	 account	 to	 maximize	 the	
effectiveness	of	securities	 law	as	a	deterrent.	 	The	combination	of	the	
engrained	 high-stakes	 of	 corporate	 management	 and	 cognitive	
dissonance	leads	to	a	highly	incentivized	actor	who	is	able	to	rationalize	
each	 micro-step	 by	 employing	 mental	 tools	 to	 nullify	 cognitive	
dissonance—and	 thus	 prospectively	 underestimate	 her	 own	
malfeasance.	 	 This	 grave	 underestimation	 transforms	 high-stakes	 to	
high-risk:	 one	 now	 has	 an	 actor	 who	 is	 despondent	 to	 deterrence	
because	 she	 is	 unaware	 she	 is	 violating	 the	 law.	 	 Therefore,	 this	
Comment	proposes	key	modifications	 to	 the	FDA,	SEC,	and	corporate	
charters	that	will	encourage	engagement	throughout	the	slow-burn	of	
the	 FDA	 approval	 process	 in	 a	 manner	 that	 increases	 beneficial	
disclosures	and,	by	doing	so,	decreases	lawsuits.	
Part	 II	 of	 this	 Comment	 will	 provide	 background	 on	 the	 law	
surrounding	 SEC	 disclosures	 and	 the	 impact	 of	 the	 FDA	 approval	
process	 on	 public	 life	 sciences	 companies.	 	 Part	 III	 will	 discuss	 the	
pitfalls	 that	public	 life	 science	 companies	 face	 in	determining	how	 to	
make	 proper	 SEC	 disclosures	 and	 how	 to	 keep	 the	 investing	 public	
apprised	of	 their	status	given	any	FDA	notifications	 they	may	receive	
while	still	driving	investment	in	the	company.		Part	IV	will	discuss	the	
commonly	 considered	 mindsets	 that	 contribute	 to	 Section	 10(b)	
liability,	 such	 as	 fraud	 or	 mistake.	 	 Part	 V	 will	 develop	 a	 third	
possibility—cognitive	 dissonance—as	 a	 mildly	 opaque	 but	 frequent	
psychological	 process	 that	 may	 account	 for	 a	 thus-far	 unrecognized	
category	of	Section	10(b)	violations.	 	Part	VI	will	explore	a	variety	of	
paths	forward,	 including	how	the	market	and	courts	currently	handle	
this	 issue,	 as	well	 as	 some	additional	 considerations	 that	 could	deter	




approvals	 from	 the	 FDA	 to	 generate	 revenue,	 the	 intersection	 of	









some	 frequency,	 ends	 in	 securities	 litigation	 under	 the	 SEA’s	 Section	
10(b).38		The	SEA	also	created	the	Securities	and	Exchange	Commission	
(SEC),	 which	 administers	 and	 promulgates	 regulations,	 such	 as	 Rule	
10b-5,	which	provides	 additional	 contours	 to	 Section	10(b).39	 	 Public	
corporate	directors	 and	managers,	 under	 the	 SEC	 regulations,	 have	 a	
duty	 to	 disclose	 to	 the	 investing	 public	 “material	 events	 and	
uncertainties	 known	 to	management”	 that	might	 reveal	 that	 publicly	
reported	 financial	 information	 is	 not	 truly	 indicative	 of	 the	
corporation’s	 condition	 within	 quarterly	 10-Q	 and	 annual	 10-K	
submissions.40	 	 Company	 managers	 are	 often	 faced	 with	 product	
imperfections—and	 subsequent	 related	 communications	 from	 the	
FDA—that	 require	 additional	 resources	 to	 overcome.	 	Managers	may	




problem	without	 capital	 but	 cannot	 raise	 capital	 if	 they	 disclose	 the	
problem—and,	 frequently,	when	 operators	 fail	 to	 thread	 this	 needle,	
class	action	securities	litigation	occurs.	
For	a	complaint	to	survive	a	motion	to	dismiss,	six	factors	must	be	
properly	 pleaded	 to	make	 a	 prima	 facie	 case—but	 only	 two	 of	 those	
factors	 are	 fertile	 grounds	 for	 conflict.	 	 The	plaintiff	must	 allege	 that	
each	defendant	had	the	required	scienter	and	that	the	facts	that	were	
omitted	 or	misrepresented	were	material.	 	 In	 order	 for	 a	 plaintiff	 to	
successfully	allege	violations	under	Section	10(b)	and	Rule	10b-5,	the	
plaintiff	 must	 allege—particular	 to	 each	 defendant—that	 (1)	 the	
defendant	 made	 a	 material	 misrepresentation	 or	 omission;	 (2)	 had	
scienter	 in	 doing	 so;	 (3)	 the	 misrepresentation	 or	 omission	 had	 a	
connection	to	the	purchase	or	sale	of	a	security	by	the	plaintiff;	(4)	the	
plaintiff	relied	on	said	misrepresentation	or	omission;	(5)	the	plaintiff	










Need	 for	 Common	 Criteria	 Governing	 Disclosure	 of	 Clinical	 Trial	 Results	 by	 Publicly-
Traded	 Pharmaceutical	 Companies,	 29	 J.	CONTEMP.	HEALTH	L.	&	POL’Y	201,	215	 (2013)		
(citing	17	C.F.R.	§	229.303)	[hereinafter	Predictable	Materiality].	




plaintiff,	 however,	 is	 relieved	 from	 pleading	 with	 any	 great	 detail	
whether	or	how	the	misrepresentation	or	omission	had	a	connection	to	
the	 sale,	 or	 if	 the	 plaintiff	 justifiably	 relied	 on	 the	 misstatement	 or	
omission,	by	the	“fraud	on	the	market”	theory:	it	is	enough	to	say	that	
the	misstatement	occurred,	and	the	plaintiff,	subsequently,	made	a	stock	
transaction,	 and	 that	 there	was	 causation	 that	 triggered	an	economic	
loss.42	 	This	leaves,	as	the	primary	challenge	for	plaintiffs	to	survive	a	
motion	 to	 dismiss,	 alleging	 that	 the	 facts	 omitted	 or	misstated	were	




have	 a	 mindset	 of	 knowledge	 or	 recklessness—this	 is	 frequently	
interpreted	 by	 courts	 as	 a	 “conscious	 disregard”	 standard:	 the	
defendant	 had	 some	 awareness	 that	 the	 behavior	was	 improper,	 but	
decided	 to	 disregard	 the	 information	 and	move	 forward	 despite	 it.44		
Scienter	has	been	adequately	alleged	in	a	complaint	“only	if	a	reasonable	
person	 would	 deem	 the	 inference	 of	 scienter	 cogent	 and	 at	 least	 as	
compelling	 as	 any	 opposing	 inference	 one	 could	 draw	 from	 the	 facts	
alleged.”45		The	materiality	of	facts	can	circumstantially	inform	the	level	
of	scienter	the	defendants	are	accused	of	having	acted	with.46		Therefore,	
the	 determination	 of	 the	 materiality	 of	 facts,	 and	 any	 circumstantial	




§	 78u-4.	 	 Given	 the	 relatively	 low	 bar	 for	 surviving	 a	 F.R.C.P.	 12(b)(6)	 motion	 to	






burden	 of	 proving	 that	 they	 specifically	 relied	 upon	 the	 material	 omission	 or		














For	example,	 in	Matrixx	v.	Siracusano,	 the	Court	decided	 it	was	a	
“cogent	 and	 compelling”	 inference	 that	 there	 was	 scienter	 when	 the	
company	chose	not	to	disclose	reports;	it	was	not	because	they	thought	
they	were	immaterial,	but	rather	because	they	“understood	their	likely	
effect	 on	 the	 market.”47	 Additionally,	 the	 Court,	 in	Matrixx,	 made	 an	
express	 point	 of	 noting,	 “[m]ost	 significantly,”	 that	 Matrixx	 issued	 a	





likely	 a	 manager	 or	 director	 is	 aware	 of	 the	 “likely	 effect”	 on	 the	
market.49	
This	prompts	a	much	needed	look	into	materiality:	a	helpful	first	
step	 in	determining	materiality	 for	 SEC	disclosures	 is	 to	 examine	 the	
Supreme	 Court’s	 opinion	 in	 Basic	 	 v.	 Levinson.50	 	 In	 Basic,	 the	 Court	
established	 a	 standard	 that	 eliminated	 “certain	 information	 .	.	.	 of	
‘dubious	significance’”	that	would	risk	overwhelming	investors	with	“an	
avalanche	 of	 trivial	 information.”51	 	 The	 Court	 tightened-up	 the	




fact	 that	any	 reasonable	 investor	would	 likely	want	 to	 claim	 that	any	
detrimental	fact	not	disclosed	is	material.		But	this	“total	mix”	standard	
only	 goes	 so	 far	 as	 a	 protection	 for	 most	 companies,	 and	 for	
pharmaceuticals	where	a	single	FDA	approval	will	gravely	 impact	 the	
bottom	 line,	 this	does	not	provide	a	 lot	of	 leeway.	 	The	 “total	mix”	of	
information	 for	 a	 public,	 small-cap	 pharmaceutical	 is	 information	
organized	 around	 a	 product	 line	 of	 one,	 two,	 or	 three	 products;	 any	
meaningful	FDA	feedback	could	jeopardize	the	very	existence	of	one	of	






	 50	 See	Basic	 Inc.	 v.	 Levinson,	485	U.S.	224,	231–32	 (1988)	 (quoting	TSC	 Indus.	 v.	
Northway,	426	U.S.	438	(1976))	(holding	that	there	“must	be	a	substantial	 likelihood	








tends	 to	 take	 on	 a	 high	 level	 of	 importance	 in	 the	 overall	 scheme	 of	
information	 available	 on	 the	 company,	 and	 it	 is,	 therefore,	 likely	 to	
exceed	the	“total	mix”	standard.54		The	Court,	in	Matrixx,	upheld	its	fact-
intensive	analysis	of	materiality	in	the	context	of	pharmaceuticals.55	
Over	 the	 last	 several	 decades,	 both	 Congress	 and	 the	 judicial	
branch	have	sought	to	refine	the	contours	of	the	burdens	placed	on	both	





plaintiffs	 to	 file	 these	 suits.58	 	While	Halliburton	 v.	 Erica	P.	 John	Fund	
provided	defendants	with	the	ability	to	rebut	the	plaintiff’s	presumption	
of	 reliance,59	 other	 cases,	 like	Arkansas	 Teacher	 Retirement	 System	 v.	
Goldman	 Sachs,	 have	 expanded	 potential	 liability	 for	 defendants:	 the	
Second	Circuit,	in	Goldman	Sachs,	lowered	the	bar	necessary	to	establish	
harm	 through	 an	 “Inflation	 Maintenance	 Theory”	 that	 allows	 for	
plaintiffs	to	establish	harm	without	showing	a	change	in	the	market.60	
III.		PITFALLS	LIFE	SCIENCE	COMPANIES	FACE	SURROUNDING	SEC	DISCLOSURES	
While	 Section	 10(b)	 presents	 challenges	 to	 various	 industries,	










	 58	 By	 instituting	 a	 “total	mix”	 approach	 in	Basic,	 and	 then	 supporting	 that	 same	
















first,	 the	 requirements	 to	 gain—and	 retain—FDA	 approval	 for	 life	





piece	 of	 biotechnology,	 traditional	 drug,	 or	 biologic	 a	 company	 is	
attempting	to	bring	to	market.61		As	an	example,	this	Comment	will	focus	
on	 the	 application	 process	 for	 biologics:	 these	 are	 large	 molecule,	
complicated	medicines	created	through	a	biological	process;	this	means	
that	 the	company	creating	the	molecule	and	the	subsequent	approval	
process	 is	 firmly	 tied	 to	 the	 manufacturing	 facility	 in	 which	 it	 is	
created.62		While	this	Comment	will	focus	on	issues	that	occur	during	the	
approval	process	of	new	biologics,	there	are	other	areas,	including	post-
approval	 actions,	where	 similar	 issues	may	arise	between	 companies	
and	the	FDA	relevant	to	this	discussion.	







to	 a	 particular	 facility—the	 sunk	 costs	 can	 present	 a	 major	 mental	
obstacle	to	forsake.	
 











	 64	 Mark	 Terry,	 The	 Median	 Cost	 of	 Bringing	 a	 Drug	 to	 Market	 is	 $985	 Million,	
According	 to	 New	 Study,	 BIOSPACE	 (Mar.	 4,	 2020)	 [hereinafter	 Millions],	
https://www.biospace.com/article/median-cost-of-bringing-a-new-drug-to-market-




Companies	 must	 begin	 by	 conducting	 their	 own	 testing	 and	
development	 phase—taking	 an	 average	 of	 over	 eight	 years—ranging	
from	 computer	 modeling	 to	 microorganism	 and	 animal	 testing.65	 	 A	
company	 must	 then	 go	 through	 the	 Investigational	 New	 Drug	 (IND)	
process	in	order	to	conduct	human	testing	to	determine	if	its	product	is	
safe.66	 	 Once	 early	 human	 trials	 are	 complete,	 the	 company	 files	 a	
Biologics	License	Application	(BLA)	with	the	FDA	to	indicate	that	they	
are	ready	to	bring	the	drug	into	interstate	commerce.67		The	FDA	then	
conducts	 inspections	 on	 the	 manufacturing	 facility.68	 	 If	 the	 FDA	
determines	 there	 may	 be	 a	 violation	 of	 applicable	 law—through	
inspection	of	the	facility,	reports,	lab	results,	or	other	findings—the	FDA	




FDA	 follows	 the	 Form	 483	 by	 sending	 an	 Establishment	 Inspection	
Report	 (EIR)	 that	 details	 the	 precise	 issues	 uncovered	 in	 the	
inspection.71		The	company	can	then	submit	a	response	to	the	FDA,	and	
 
	 65	 The	 Beginnings:	 Laboratory	 and	 Animal	 Studies,	 FOOD	&	DRUG	ADMIN.	 (Apr.	 27,	
2015),	 https://www.fda.gov/drugs/drug-information-consumers/beginnings-labora-
tory-and-animal-studies;	How	Do	 I	 Go	 About	 Getting	 a	 Drug	 Approved?,	 FOOD	&	DRUG	
ADMIN.	 (Feb.	 1,	 2016),	 https://www.fda.gov/industry/fda-basics-industry/how-do-i-
go-about-getting-drug-approved.	
	 66	 Development	 &	 Approval	 Process	 (CBER),	 FOOD	&	DRUG	ADMIN.	 (June	 25,	 2020),	
https://www.fda.gov/vaccines-blood-biologics/development-approval-process-cber	
(stating	 that	 an	 “Investigational	 New	 Drug	 Application	 (IND)	 is	 a	 request	 for	
authorization	from	the	[FDA]	to	administer	an	investigational	drug	or	biological	product	
to	humans”);	see	also	U.S.	DEP’T	OF	HEALTH	&	HUM.	SERVS.,	FOOD	&	DRUG	ADMIN.,	CTR.	FOR	DRUG	
EVALUATION	 &	 RSCH.	 (CDER),	 GUIDANCE	 FOR	 INDUSTRY	 AND	 REVIEWERS:	 EXPLORATORY	 IND	
STUDIES	 3–4	 (2006),	 https://www.fda.gov/media/72325/download	 (explaining	 the	
purpose	and	scope	of	an	IND).		
	 67	 Development	&	Approval	Process,	supra	note	66	(citing	21	C.F.R.	§	601.2);	see	also	




2014).	 	Additionally,	once	a	biologic	 is	certified	by	 the	FDA,	biennial	 inspections	will	
commence;	 therefore,	 a	 Form	 483,	 and	 the	 subsequent	 string	 of	 FDA	 actions,	 can	
commence	later	 in	a	product’s	 lifecycle,	should	the	manufacturing	conditions	change.		
FOOD	 &	 DRUG	 ADMIN.,	 BIOLOGIC	 COMPLIANCE	 PROGRAM	 5	 (2010),	 https://www.fda.gov/
media/73834/download	(last	visited	Oct.	24,	2021).	
	 69	 Form	 483	 Frequently	 Asked	 Questions,	 FOOD	 &	 DRUG	 ADMIN.	 (Jan.	 9,	 2020)	







if	 the	 FDA	 finds	 that	 response	 lacking	 in	 regard	 to	 a	 violation	 of	






window,	 the	company	 faces	some	degree	of	knowledge	regarding	 the	
challenge	it	faces	to	right	the	ship	as	well	as	the	need	to	fund	solutions.		
The	 FDA	 has	 a	 process,	 after	 a	 Form	 483	 is	 submitted,	 to	 allow	 a	
company	 to	 make	 corrections.75	 	 This	 process	 is	 essential—but	 also	
dangerous—because,	 as	 discussed	 below,	 it	 is	 fertile	 earth	 for	 the	
induction	of	cognitive	dissonance76	due	to	the	opaqueness,	malleability,	
and,	 often,	 the	 small-step	 changes	 required	 to	 mend	 a	 perceived	
problem.	 	 The	 process,	 thus,	 creates	 opportunities	 for	 managers	 to	
subconsciously	 self-manipulate	 their	 own	 understandings	 of	 the	
viability	of	the	product.	
B.		How	SEA	Disclosures	Interact	with	The	FDA	Approval	Process	
Against	 the	 backdrop	 of	 securities	 law,	 when	 FDA-related	














a	 progression	 of	 Form	 483	 difficulties	 over	 many	 months,	 making	 multiple	 public	
disclosures	 while	 managing	 the	 evolving	 FDA	 notifications.	 	 See,	 e.g.,	 Eric	 Palmer,	
Troubled	 Immunomedics	 Now	Hit	 with	 CRL	 for	 Breast	 Cancer	 Drug	 Candidate,	 FIERCE	
PHARMA	 (Jan.	 18,	 2019),	 https://www.fiercepharma.com/manufacturing/troubled-









about	 the	 business.77	 	 But	 even	positive	 clinical	 results	 can	 present	 a	
liability	 to	 the	 company	 if	 that	 result	 is	 given	 outsized	 weight	 in	
communications	 and	 is	 eventually	 not	 dispositive	 of	 the	 product’s	
viability.78	 	 Yet,	 the	 real	 landmine	 is	 the	 Form	 48379—and	 the	
subsequent	threat	of	a	CRL80—because	a	Form	483	can	signify	a	range	
of	 problems	 (scaling	 from	 solvable	 to	 unsolvable).	 	 And,	 since	 the	
number	 of	 opportunities	 the	 FDA	will	 provide	 to	 correct	 the	 error	 is	
unknowable,	the	value	of	the	Form	483	can	be	an	unknown	variable.81		
A	 Form	 483	 presents	 a	 tangible	 problem—but	 a	 problem	 that	 can	
possibly	be	solved,	per	FDA	protocol.82		By	presenting	a	cryptic	pathway	







annual	 Form	 10-K	 submissions	 “material	 events	 and	 uncertainties	
known	to	management	that	would	cause	reported	financial	information	
 




may	 perceive	 the	 positive	 clinical	 results	 as	 a	 biased	 way	 of	 manipulating	 investor	






























or	 at	 an	 event—still	 carry	 the	 burden	 of	 not	 being	 materially	
misleading.86		It	is	essential	to	note	that	the	timing	of	the	Form	10-Q	and	








or	 scientific	 problem?	 	 And	 (2)	 is	 this	 a	 material	 change	 to	 the	
business—also	known	as:	Must	I	disclose	this?		The	more	substantial	the	
level	of	difficulty	rendered	by	the	 former	seems	to	 implicate	a	higher	
likelihood	 of	 the	 latter;	 however,	 it	 is	 not	 clear	 when	 disclosure	 is	
required.		Therefore,	the	manager	might	lobby	for	time	to	neutralize	the	
problem	before	making	a	disclosure	that	would	risk	upsetting	the	apple	
cart—and	subsequently	 losing	shareholder	value	and	 the	potential	 to	
raise	additional	capital.		After	all,	if	this	is	part	of	the	natural—perhaps	
even	typical—progression	of	the	FDA	approval	process,	is	it	essential	or	




second	 problem.	 	 Even	 providing	 that	 it	 may	 be	 permissible	 not	 to	
disclose	 specific	 information	 on	 the	 prior	 date	 of	 disclosure,	 the	
company	may	move	on	to	make	other,	unrelated	disclosures.		But,	not	
only	 must	 those	 disclosures	 not	 contain	 materially	 misleading	
information,	but	they	cannot	“omit	.	.	.	a	material	fact	necessary	in	order	






	 87	 See	Predictable	Materiality,	 supra	 note	 40,	 at	 224–225	 (discussing	 the	 duty	 to	





which	 they	 were	 made,	 not	 misleading.”88	 	 Therefore,	 should	 the	
company	make	a	disclosure,	ignoring	the	issue	at	hand,	it	is	possible	that	
making	an	otherwise	neutral	statement	about	the	company	may	imply	





to	 see	 how	 the	 traditional	 perspectives	 on	 corporate	 mindsets	 have	
dwelt	 on	 two	 extreme	 ends	 of	 the	 spectrum:	managers	 acting	 either	
fraudulently	or	 innocently,	due	to	confusion.	 	This	section	will	briefly	
look	at	Eric	Schmid’s	Fraud	or	Confusion,	which	looks	to	bifurcate	the	
possible	managerial	mindsets	 into	 two	 distinct	 categories:	 fraud	 and	
confusion.90	 	 The	 Note	 sophisticatedly	 proposes	 these	 two	 opposite	
polls	 and	 then	 suggests	 a	 variety	 of	 solutions	 for	 each	 cause.91	 	 This	
section	 will	 briefly	 touch	 on	 a	 willfully	 fraudulent	 mindset	 and	 a	
confusion-driven	innocent	mindset.	
A.		The	Frequency	of	Willful	Fraud	
















allege	 “[ZZZZ]	 Best’s	 glamorous	 aura	 was	 a	 sham,	 and	 that	 a	 massive	 fraud	 was		
perpetrated	in	connection	with	the	public	trading	of	[the	company]”).	
	 94	 In	re	Enron	Corp.	Sec.,	235	F.	Supp.	2d	549,	637	(S.D.	Tex.	2002)	(stating	that	the	












small	 group	 of	 bad	 actors	 operating	 knowingly.	 	 Conflicts	 of	 interest	
often	mire	cases	of	willful	fraud.98		For	example,	in	WorldCom,	Bernard	




at	 the	 company	 started	 in	 2000	 when	 they	 were	 directed	 to	 “do	




action;	 on	 the	other	hand,	Ebber’s	 employees	 and	Board	of	Directors	
were	 conflicted	 between	 their	 obligations	 to	 the	 company	 and	 their	
loyalty	to	Ebbers.103	
While	 Enron’s	 key	 actors	 may	 have	 been	 actively	 aware	 of	 the	
fraudulent	 accounting	 practices	 they	 were	 engaging	 in,	 Professor	
Robert	Prentice	suggested	that	their	direct	reports	may	not	have	come	
forward	 to	 expose	 the	 fraud	 due	 to	 cognitive	 dissonance.104	 	 He	
proposed	that	cognitive	dissonance	allowed	many	of	the	employees	who	
were	not	acting	willfully	fraudulently	to	continue	to	act	in	the	business	
despite	 conflicting	 facts.105	 	 This	 Comment	 will	 explore,	 below,	 how	
cognitive	dissonance	can	be	a	factor	in	the	primary	actor’s	conduct.	
 




















Fraud	 or	 Confusion,	 Schmid	 suggests	 that	 FDA	 notifications	 are	
inherently	 confusing,	 and	 that	 makes	 it	 impossible	 for	 managers,	 in	
some	instances,	to	be	aware	of	potential	disclosure	errors.106	
Fraud	or	Confusion	looks	to	Levi	v.	Atossa	Genetics,	Inc.,107	out	of	the	
Ninth	 Circuit,	 as	 a	 case	 involving	 FDA	 related	 confusion.108	 	 In	 one	
instance,	 Atossa	 correctly	 described	 the	 FDA	 clearance	 of	 its	MASCT	
System	in	its	IPO	documents,	stating	that	it	had	received	limited	FDA-
certification	for	an	express	purpose.109		But	in	a	separate	instance	in	the	







us	with	a	 rational	 concern	 that,	 scientifically,	 “reasonable	minds	may	
differ,”	 and	 such	 “disagreements	 could	 equate	 to	 misstatements	 of	
material	 fact	 under	 SEC	 regulations.”113	 	 The	 issues	 raised	 in	Atossa,	






















a	 product	 of	 groupthink115	 and	 the	 individual	 manager	 or	 director’s	
desire	 to	 eliminate	 conflicting	 inputs	 while	 maintaining	 forward	
momentum.	 	 The	 elimination	 of	 these	 dissonant	 elements	may	 occur	
consciously	or	unconsciously.		Notably,	the	less	conscious	the	behavior,	
the	 more	 difficult	 the	 behavior	 is	 to	 deter.	 As	 securities	 laws	 are	
designed	to	deter	harmful	behaviors	and	to	remediate	when	deterrence	
has	 failed,116	 understanding	 how	 cognitive	 dissonance	 may	 impede	
deterrence	 is	 relevant	 to	 evaluating	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 existing	
securities	law.	
Securities	 laws	 are	 designed	 to	 deter	 harmful	 behaviors	 and	 to	










at	 the	 point	 of	 action.	 	 But	 looking	 at	 that	 same	 series	 of	 events	
prospectively—from	the	vantage	point	of	the	actor	prior	to	taking	the	
action—cognitive	 dissonance	may	 make	 it	 nearly	 impossible	 for	 an	












	 119	 When	people	 lack	 awareness	 that	 their	 behavior	 is	 criminal,	 there	 is	 likely	no	
deterrent	 effect.	 	 See	 VALERIE	WRIGHT,	 SENT’G	 PROJECT,	DETERRENCE	 IN	 CRIMINAL	 JUSTICE:	
EVALUATING	CERTAINTY	 VS.	SEVERITY	 OF	PUNISHMENT	 2	 (2010)	 (stating	 that	 people	with	 a	
“temporarily	impaired	capacity	to	consider	the	pros	and	cons	of	their	actions”	lack	the	
ability	to	be	deterred	from	the	conduct).	







including	the	moment	of	 the	conduct.	 	Mens	rea	may	only	 look	to	the	
moment	of	actus	reus,	but	the	more	time,	prior	to	the	act,	an	actor	has,	





possible	 steps	 of	 escalation:	 attaining	 a	 gun	 (legally	 or	 illegally);	
assembling	a	group	to	act;	walking	into	a	bank;	and	pulling	out	the	gun	
inside	 a	 bank	 branch.	 	 Each	 substantial	 step	 leads	 to	 another	 and	
requires	 a	 relatively	 significant	 choice—and	 thus	 an	 inferable	
mindset.121			
In	 securities	 law,	each	choice	 can	be	much	smaller:	 for	example,	
stalling	a	disclosure	for	a	few	days	until	more	information	is	available;	
not	disclosing	a	third	Form	483	when	the	manager	is	convinced	some	
progress	was	made;	 hosting	 an	 investors’	 call	 and	 explaining	 away	 a	
very	negative	Form	483	as	 “part	of	 the	normal	process;”	or	 issuing	a	
press	release	explaining	that	the	company	is	still	on	track	for	approval,	
even	though	some	advisors	have	suggested	a	Warning	Letter	may	be	on	
its	way.	 	 Instead	 of	 a	 series	 of	 significant	 steps,	 the	 path	 to	 violating	
Section	10(b)	begins	to	 look	more	 like	a	smooth	curve.	 	The	practical	
result	of	which	is	that	you	may	have	a	culpable	mens	rea	retrospectively:	
a	factfinder	may	review	a	pattern	of	behavior	and	determine	that,	at	the	





















broader	 problem.122	 	 First,	 this	 Part	 will	 look	 at	 how	 cognitive	
dissonance	 is	 a	 driving	 force	 for	 an	 individual	 to	 seek	 consonance	
through	 behavioral	 or	 belief	 changes.	 	 Second,	 this	 Part	 will	 discuss	
cognitive	dissonance	as	a	subjective	state	of	mind—and	a	driving	force	










For	 an	 individual,	 cognitive	 dissonance	 develops	 when	 new	
information	conflicts	with	existing	information.123		Cognitive	dissonance	
compels	 the	mind	 to	 eliminate	 or	 diminish	 the	 dissonance,	 reaching	
consonance.124	 	 Individuals	 lose	 objectivity	 when	 new,	 conflicting	
information	 is	 distinguished	 and	 subsumed	 into	 the	 former	 fact,	
eliminating	 internal	 dissonance,	 but	 establishing	 an	 objectively	
incorrect	belief	in	the	process.125		Corporate	cognitive	dissonance	may	
result	in	an	actor	having	the	necessary	mens	rea	to	be	culpable	under	






	 122	 See	 Scott	 Killingsworth,	 ‘C’	 is	 for	 Crucible:	 Behavioral	 Ethics,	 Culture,	 and	 the	
Board’s	Role	 in	C-Suite	Compliance,	RAND	CENTER	FOR	CORPORATE	ETHICS	AND	GOVERNANCE	















resolved	 instantaneously,	 placing	 the	 individual	 back	 into	
consonance.127			
For	a	simplistic	example,	person	A	was	told	by	person	B	yesterday	
that	 it	 would	 be	 sunny	 today.128	 	 Person	 A	 believes	 person	 B	 and,	
therefore,	intends	to	go	to	the	park.129	 	Upon	looking	out	the	window,	
person	A	 discovers	 that	 it	 is	 not	 sunny,	 but	 storming.	 	 This	 new	 fact	








sophisticated,	 fraudulent	 investment	 scheme	 might	 be	 tempted	 to	
follow	the	adage	 “in	 for	a	penny,	 in	 for	a	pound,”	despite	discovering	
worrisome	 facts	 about	 their	 would-be	 defrauder.	 	 Even	 with	 clear,	
superior	 facts—for	 instance,	 a	 news	 report	 on	 the	 fraud—the	 victim	
might	 find	 that	 many	 pressures—such	 as	 financial	 dependencies	 or	
interpersonal	 relationships—deter	 an	 easy	 resolution	 of	 the	 factual	
dilemma.	 	 This	 creates	 persistent	 dissonance	 that	 the	 victim	 will	 be	
instinctually	drawn	to	eliminate,	per	Dr.	Leon	Festinger	above,	bringing	
himself	back	into	consonance.	
The	 magnitude	 of	 the	 fact	 misalignment	 amplifies	 the	
uncomfortable	 dissonance.	 	 Festinger	 states	 that	 “[c]ognitive	
dissonance	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 an	 antecedent	 condition	 which	 leads	 to	
activity	oriented	towards	dissonance	reduction	just	as	hunger	leads	to	
activity	oriented	toward	hunger	reduction.”132		Each	fact,	internalized	by	
























There	are	methods	 to	 reduce	dissonance	 constructively,	 keeping	
the	 subject	 in	 alignment	 with	 the	 objective	 reality.135	 	 This	 usually	
requires	 an	 active	 approach:	 (1)	 changing	 a	 behavior,	 (2)	 changing	 a	
belief,	or	(3)	changing	an	environmental	element.136			




is	 objectively	 truthful—the	 individual	 can	 resolve	 the	 conflicting	
information	by	eliminating	the	false	cognitive	element,	allowing	a	return	
to	consonance.	
But	 sometimes,	 cognitive	 dissonance	 fails	 the	 individual.	 By	
Festinger’s	 model—consciously	 or	 unconsciously137—a	 person	 can	
create	 new	 facts	 or	 beliefs	 that	 reduce	 or	 eliminate	 the	 dissonance,	
placing	 them	 internally—psychologically—in	 consonance.138	 	When	 a	
change	in	belief	is	discordant	with	reality—when	a	person	distinguishes	








	 136	 See	 FESTINGER,	 supra	 note	 127,	 at	 19–23	 (discussing	 changing	 behavior	 and	










Why	 create	 new	 information	 instead	 of	 resolving	 things	
objectively?	 	 Practical	 limitations—such	 as	 a	 high	 cost	 or	 a	 sunk	
investment—may	offer	strong	incentives	against	changing	a	behavior	or	
a	 belief.140	 	 And	 environmental	 elements—such	 as	 the	 status	 of	 a	
product	or	an	FDA	decision—may	be	clear	and	unchangeable,	like	the	
weather	 at	 the	 park,	 but	 frequently	 environmental	 elements	 are	
ambiguous	and	difficult	to	navigate,	 like	an	agency’s	recommendation	
or	 a	 scientific	 result;	 additionally,	 environment	 elements	 are	 often	
external	 and,	 therefore,	 inherently	 resistive	 to	 change.141	 	 Finally,	
another	roadblock	to	changing	behavior,	belief,	or	environment	is	that	
changing	one	cognitive	element	may	place	that	element	in	dissonance	
with	 another	 cognitive	 element,	 creating	 integrated	 resistance	 to	
change.142	





















	 143	 The	 level	 at	 which	 the	 manufacturing	 of	 this	 new	 fact	 is	 conscious,	 or	
subconscious,	is	not	necessarily	clear:	there	are	competing	theories.		See	Jack	Anthony	




which	points	 towards	unconscious	 choices	 as	 the	driving	mechanism	 for	dissonance	
reduction).	 	 If	 these	behaviors	were	entirely	subconscious,	 this	would	raise	concerns	





Individuals	 can	 maintain	 states	 of	 internal	 dissonance	 under	




Looking	to	our	above	victim	of	 investment	 fraud,	 the	victim	may	
not	be	able	to	rectify	the	dissonance,	as	there	may	be	other	dissonant	




victim	hears	 from	his	brother	who	says	(3)	 the	brother	made	a	 lot	of	
money	from	the	fraudster:	it	worked!		And	then	(4)	another	colleague	
reports	 that	 the	 fraudster	 is	 being	 indicted.	 	 Now	 there	 are	 four	
dissonant	 facts,	 some	balancing	 against	 each	 other.	 	 The	 victim	must	
weigh	 the	 value	 of	 each	 fact—the	 source	 of	 the	 information	 and	 the	
authoritative	quality—but	those	are	also	balanced	against	the	outcome	
the	 victim	 may	 be	 reliant	 on	 seeing:	 not	 being	 defrauded	 by	 the	






greater	 magnitude	 or	 (2)	 successfully	 distinguishing	 the	 dissonant	
elements	by	generating	new	facts	or	beliefs	or	reprocessing	ambiguous,	
existing	 facts.	 	 From	 an	 external,	 impartial,	 third-party	 observer,	 the	
conclusion	can	appear	the	same:	the	subject	is	functioning	while	relying	
















Just	 as	 the	 government	 uses	 quantitative	 easing	 to	 buoy	 the	
economy	while	avoiding	direct	handouts,	corporate	managers	can	use	







Similarly,	 cognitive	 dissonance	 can	 be	 reduced	 by	 a	 form	 of	
cognitive	 easing,147	 allowing	 the	 brain	 to	 generate	 new	 facts—or	
distinguishing	 features—and	 apply	 them	 to	 dissonant	 cognitive	
elements	 to	 gently	 bring	 them	 into	 consonance.148	 	 The	 higher	 the	
magnitude	of	 dissonance	 the	more	difficult	 it	will	 be	 to	 ease	 the	 two	
elements	 into	 consonance,149	 and	 thus,	 likely,	 the	more	 cognizant	 the	
actor	 will	 be	 of	 the	 process	 due	 to	 the	 difficulty	 in	 rectifying	 the	
differential.	 	 Like	 tension	 on	 a	 suspension	 bridge,	 dissonance	 can	 be	
maintained	 when	 the	 resolution	 of	 that	 dissonance—consonance—
comes	 at	 a	 cost	 of	 greater	 dissonance	 between	 other	 cognitive	
elements.150	
Imagine	 the	 typical	 manager	 of	 a	 public	 company:	 while	 that	
individual	has	been	forged	through	the	challenging	process	of	rising	to	
the	 C-Suite,	 it	 is	 likely	 that	 person—like	 a	 statistically	 significant	
number	 of	 people—believes	 herself	 to	 be	 “psychologically	 normal,”	
 











	 149	 See	 infra	 note	 160	 and	 accompanying	 text.	 	 But,	 notably,	 the	 greater	 the		





valuing	 morality	 and	 considering	 herself	 ethical.151	 	 So	 how	 does	 a	
normal,	 ethical	person	misrepresent	 facts	 to	 the	 investors—to	whom	
she	owes	fiduciary	duties—and	thus	commit	securities	violations?	




One	 key	 mechanism	 behind	 cognitive	 easing	 is	 incrementalism.		
Incrementalism	 looks	 at	 the	 small	 steps	people	 take,	 sequenced	over	













Tenbrunsel,	 Ethical	 Breakdowns,	 HARV.	 BUS.	 REV.	 (Apr.	 2011)	 [hereinafter	 Ethical		
Breakdowns]	(noting	relevant	conflicts	of	interest	in	an	organization	and	subsequently	
relying	 on	 integrity	 is	 not,	 alone,	 sufficient	 “because	 honest	 people	 can	 suffer	 from		
motivated	blindness”).	
	 153	 The	pressure	of	key	launch	dates—or	IPOs,	capital	raises,	or	quarterly	reports—
can	 greatly	 impede	 a	 manager’s	 willingness	 to	 stop	 and	 consider	 the	 full	 ethical	
ramifications	of	their	actions.		See	Crucible,	supra	note	122,	at	6–7	(discussing	a	social	
experiment	where	unhurried	people	 stopped	 to	help	a	 “groaning	man	collapsed	 in	a	
doorway”;	 sixty-three	percent	of	 students	did	so	under	 typical	 conditions,	but	under	
time	constraints,	only	ten	percent	stopped	to	help).	
	 154	 Many	people	are	irrationally	motivated	to	stop	a	loss,	rather	than	to	achieve	an	
equivalent	 gain—and	 will	 increase	 their	 willingness	 to	 take	 risks	 or	 violate	 ethical	
standards	in	order	to	prevent	that	loss.		Crucible,	supra	note	122,	at	7	(discussing	the	
effect	of	“prospect	theory,”	and	how	it	applies	in	the	C-Suite).	













occurs	when	 actions	 are	 repetitious,	 and	 one	 becomes	 less	 aware	 or	
reflective	of	the	substance	of	the	action.159			
For	example,	 imagine	a	pharmaceutical	executive	who	receives	a	
report	 indicating	 a	 small	 percentage	 decrease	 in	 effectiveness.	 	 This	
executive	may	note	 that	 this	 is	not	a	material	change	 in	efficacy.	 	But	
over	 time,	 there	may	be	many	of	 these	reports.	 	 Induction	allows	 the	
executive	to	perceive	the	small	variable	as	being	imperceptibly	different	
from	the	original	value,	and	numbness—the	repeated	application	of	this	
induction—can	 inhibit	 recognizing	 a	 growing	 downward	 trend.	 	 This	
compounding	error	is	only	more	troubling	and	likely	to	occur	when	it	
involves	 cryptic	 soft-data—such	 as	 reports,	 opinions,	 or	 more	
complicated,	 multi-vector	 data	 outputs—instead	 of	 clear	 numeric	
values	 that	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 be	 discovered	 through	 diligent	
monitoring.	
Induction	 is	 the	 process	where	 the	 human	mind	 is	 incapable	 of	
accounting	 for	 a	 small	 enough	 change	 in	 circumstances—the	 mind	
determines	 that	 this	 new	 cognitive	 element	 is	 “almost	 identical”	 to	 a	
previous	 cognitive	 element	 that	 was	 deemed	 to	 be	 acceptable	 and	
ethical.	 	 Therefore,	 it	 allows	 the	 mind	 to	 accept	 the	 new	 cognitive	
element	as	being	in	alignment	with	the	prior	elements.160			
The	above	forces	tie	together	to	allow,	in	varying	recipes,	objective	
individual	 cognitive	 dissonance	 in	 the	 C-Suite.	 	 Once	 competing	
cognitive	 elements	 are	 introduced—for	 example,	 a	 drug	 will	 be	
successful	 but	 requires	 more	 capital	 (“thought	 1”),	 and	 a	 new,	
perceived-to-be	 adverse	 FDA	 notice	 could,	 if	 known,	 jeopardize	 the	




manger	 to	 perform.	 	 The	 manager	 is	 then	 driven	 to	 eliminate	 the	
dissonance:	that	manager	may	change	the	belief	that	a	capital	raise	is	
required	or	engage	in	cognitively	reshaping	of	the	dissonant	element	to	
eliminate	 the	 conflict—either	 will	 bring	 these	 two	 thoughts	 into	












consonance,	 the	 manager	 would	 have	 to	 determine	 that	 additional	
funding	is	not	required,	or	secure	it	from	a	new	source:	this	may	be	more	
costly,	 less	 rewarding,	 and	 it	 requires	 a	 change	 in	 course,	 breaking	
momentum.	 	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 motivated	 blindness	may	 allow	 the	
manager	 to	discount	 environmental,	 cognitive	 elements—such	 as	 the	
status	 of	 an	 FDA	 notice—as	 being	 unclear	 or	 uncertain.162	 	 Once	 the	
environmental,	cognitive	element	of	the	FDA	notice	is	distinguished	and	
minimalized,	 it	 may	 be	 interpreted,	 through	 induction,	 as	 being	
equivalent	 to	 a	 prior,	 insignificant	 update,	 unworthy	 of	 a	mandatory	
disclosure.163		Now	the	problem	has	been	resolved	without	a	change	in	
course—instead,	it	only	required	a	mild	psychological	deviation.	






unethical	 conduct-driven	 incrementalism	might	 still	 play	 a	 role	 with	








risking	 calling	 attention	 to	 the	 error	 in	 the	 process.	 	 Either	way,	 the	




































There,	 the	 two	 dissonant	 thoughts	 involved	 the	 individuals’	 self-
perceptions	 as	 ethical	 beings	 and	 the	 knowledge	 that	 there	 was	
significant	potential	for	death.		Bazerman	and	Tenbrunsel	state	that	the	
executives	 decided	 it	 was	 a	 “business	 decision,”	 and	 therefore	
distinguishable	from	their	own	personal	moral	and	ethical	compass—
and	this	may	be	seen	as	a	version	of	motivated	blindness,169	because	it	
demonstrates	 the	 mind	 working	 to	 eliminate	 the	 dissonance	 by	
redefining	the	nature	of	the	environmental	fact.170	
 
	 167	 Problem	 solving	 includes	 persistence	 and	 “resilience	 to	 withstand	 inevitable	
pushback	 from	 co-workers.”	 	 What	 Are	 Problem-solving	 Skills	 and	 Why	 Are	 They	
Important?,	 CAREERBUILDER	 (Apr.	 13,	 2021),	 https://www.careerbuilder.com/advice/
what-are-problemsolving-skills-and-why-are-they-important	 (a	 web	 article	 designed	
for	instructing	younger,	would-be-managers	on	what	it	takes	to	be	a	manager);	Margo	
Reder,	 CEO	 Postings	 -	 Leveraging	 the	 Internet’s	 Communications	 Potential	 While	
Managing	 the	 Message	 to	 Maintain	 Corporate	 Governance	 Interests	 in	 Information	





	 169	 Motivated	 blindness	 does	 not	 necessarily	 rise	 to	 the	 legal	 concept	 of	 “willful	
blindness.”	 	 Motivated	 blindness	 is	 merely	 suggesting	 that	 there	 is	 an	 incentive	 to	
remain	blind	and	does	not	specifically	speak	to	a	conscious	attempt	to	remain	blind.		See	
Crucible,	supra	note	122,	at	6,	for	a	discussion	of	motivated	blindness	in	business	ethics.	







materiality	 moot	 in	 regard	 to	 their	 investor-facing	 communications.		
When	 new,	 adverse	 information	 presents	 itself	 to	 a	 manager,	 that	
manager	 generally	 must	 acknowledge	 the	 severity	 of	 the	 issue—for	
example,	a	relevant	legal	notice,	an	alert	triggered	by	an	employee,	or	a	
data	 breach—by	 taking	 action	 to	 remedy	 the	 situation.	 	 The	 level	 of	
alarm	raised	here	may	be	seen	to	inform	the	seriousness	to	which	the	
manager	regards	the	situation.		Yet,	despite	the	seriousness	of	actions	
required,	 that	 manager	 may	 then	 be	 motivated	 to	 disregard	 the	
seriousness	 as	 it	 applies	 to	material	 disclosures	under	 Section	10(b).		
Objectively,	 one	 may	 imagine	 a	 trend	 to	 exist:	 if	 the	 element	 was	 a	
serious	element	in	one	category,	it	might	likely	be	of	material	value	to	
the	 investors.	 	 That	 is	 not	 to	 declare	 that	 these	 are	 always	 identical,	
merely	that	this	should	raise	the	question.		But	that	ambiguity	creates	
room	for	motivated	blindness	to	repackage	the	dissatisfactory	cognitive	
element,	 distinguishing	 it	 from	 a	 dangerous	 fact	 that	 would	 induce	
internal	cognitive	dissonance.		Additionally,	incrementalism	can	be	seen	
here	 to	 allow	 a	 subject	 to	 conflate	 additional	 investigative	 reports	
regarding	 an	 employee’s	 bad	 actions—where	 prior	 notices	 were	
deemed	 immaterial	 to	 global	 operations—as	 indistinguishable	 from	
past	notifications	 through	 induction	and,	 should	 these	actions	repeat,	























Specifically,	 when	 a	 Form	 483	 is	 presented	 to	 the	 business,	 the	
form	is	fairly	clear	about	what	 issues	it	 is	 indicating.173	 	But	the	Form	
483	will	likely	not	prescribe	solutions	to	those	issues.174		This	leaves	a	
manager	with	a	dilemma:	the	manager	needs	to	fix	the	issues—and	may	
need	 capital	 to	 do	 it—but	 the	 manager,	 between	 time	 pressure	 and	
irrational	loss	aversion,	will	be	motivated	to	avoid	identifying	the	Form	
483	 elements	 as	 material	 to	 investors—doing	 so	 would	 derail	 the	




to	be	reported.	 	 If	 the	pressure	of	 these	 two	 items	 is	not	enough,	 the	








Now,	after	reviewing	cognitive	dissonance	 in	 the	 life	science’s	C-
Suite,	 a	 fresh	 look	 at	 Atossa	 calls	 into	 question	 whether	 Schmid’s	
framing	of	the	case	as	being	driven	by	“confusion”	is	entirely	satisfactory	
or	 whether	 cognitive	 dissonance	 might	 prove	 an	 alternative—if	 not	
more	likely—explanation.		
In	 Atossa,	 the	 Ninth	 Circuit	 reviewed	 a	 motion	 to	 dismiss	 the	
district	court	granted	in	favor	of	Atossa	Genetics.176		The	court	affirmed	
 





	 175	 James	 A.	 Fanto,	 Braking	 the	 Merger	 Momentum:	 Reforming	 Corporate	 Law	
Governing	 Mega-Mergers,	 49	 BUFFALO	 L.	 REV.	 249,	 257–58	 (2001)	 (discussing	
sophisticated	 investors	 being	 “caught	 up	 in	 the	 same	 psychological	 momentum	





in	 part	 and	 reversed	 in	 part.177	 	 Atossa	 had	 two	 primary	 revenue	
sources:	MASCT	System	and	ForeCYTE	Test.178		The	MASCT	System	had	
received	 a	 limited	 FDA-certification	 “for	 use	 in	 collecting	 NAF	
samples.”179		Steven	Quay,	Atossa’s	CEO,	made	a	statement	in	a	Form	8-
K	 report	 on	 December	 20,	 2012,	 that	 included	 an	 indication	 that	
ForeCYTE	 was	 “FDA-cleared.”180	 	 Additionally,	 on	 News-Medical.net,	
Quay	was	quoted	as	saying	that	ForeCYTE	“has	gone	through	all	of	the	
FDA	 clearance	 process”	 (“Incident	 One”).181	 	 In	 one	 instance,	 Atossa	




made	 the	 product	 appear	 further	 along	 and	 more	 imminently	
profitable—the	 court	 described	 this	 as	 Atossa	 using	 “less	 precise	






on	March	 15,	 2013,	 that	 the	 “FDA	 clearance	 risk	 has	 been	 achieved”	
(“Incident	Five”).186	
The	Ninth	Circuit	 in	Atossa	 affirmed	 the	 district	 court’s	 decision	
from	 Incident	 Two	 and	 Incident	 Four—granting	 the	 motion	 to	
dismiss.187		But	the	Ninth	Circuit	reversed	the	District	Court	on	Incidents	
One,	Three,	and	Five.188		Incidents	One	and	Two	were	very	similar,	but	
with	 a	 key	 distinction:	 Incident	 Two	 appears	 to	 have	 involved	more	
“confusion”—the	Ninth	Circuit	 stressed	 that	 the	 issue	 in	 the	 IPO	was	
















qualifying	 fact	 around	 the	 FDA	 clearance;	 Incident	One,	 on	 the	 other	
hand,	imputed	an	FDA	approval	from	one	key	product	to	the	other.189			
Notably,	while	there	may	have	been	some	confusion	related	to	the	
scope	 of	 FDA	 approval,	 or	 the	 process	 in	 which	 responses	 to	 FDA	
warning	letters	is	handled,	by	all	appearances,	the	dominant	driver	in	
this	 case	 was	 a	 series	 of	 actions	 that	 crossed	 the	 line	 from	 “mere	
corporate	 optimism”	 and	waltzed	 right	 into	 a	 conscious	 disregard	 of	
material,	 known	 facts.190	 	 Over	 the	 course	 of	 three	 months,	 Atossa’s	
management	 attempted	 to	 make	 their	 product,	 ForeCYTE,	 appear	
further	along	and	more	imminently	profitable—it	seems	like	an	unlikely	






cannot	 seek	 help	 to	 avoid	 current,	 prevent	 future,	 or	 remedy	 past	
incidents.		This	likely	means	that	deterrents	lose	effect	because	when	a	
person	 cannot	 understand	 that	 the	 very	 nature	 of	 their	 actions	may	
trigger	a	legal	consequence,	that	deterrent	does	not	have	value	to	that	
individual.191		And	this	leaves	us	with	a	key	difference	between	a	subject	
affected	 by	 cognitive	 dissonance	 and	 a	 subject	who	 acts	knowingly	 in	
order	to	exploit	the	system:	the	person	knowingly	doing	it	is,	in	fact,	self-
aware	 of	 the	 problem	 and	 can,	 therefore,	 seek	 legal	 counsel	 to	 best	
rectify	the	situation.		On	the	other	hand,	the	person	who	is	experiencing	
internally	 consonant,	 objective	 cognitive	 dissonance	 is	not	 aware	 and	
therefore	less	likely	to	realize	that	she	requires	counsel,	nor	would	she	
be	willing	 to	entertain	 the	 severity	of	her	actions	 in	discussions	with	
counsel.		A	manager	might	be	the	top	of	her	field,	supported	by	a	variety	
of	able,	intelligent	people	who	know	better,	yet	it	is	still	possible	for	her	
















made	 choices,	 at	 the	 onset	 of	 the	 issue,	 to	 eliminate	 the	 cognitive	
dissonance.		Given	that	this	is	a	sophisticated	actor,	with	fiduciary	duties	
to	the	company,	the	initial	state	of	dissonance—in	concert	with	the	high	
stakes	 and	 knowledge	 of	 the	 situation—would	 likely	make	 the	 actor	
“consciously	aware	of	a	substantial	and	unjustifiable	risk.”192		The	drive	








Despite	 critics	 of	 class	 action	 securities	 litigation,194	 there	 do	
appear	to	be	benefits—such	as	establishing	confidence	and	protection	
for	investors,	allowing	individual	shareholders	who	otherwise	lack	the	
means	 to	 bring	 an	 action	 to	 bring	 one,	 and	 deterring	 wrongful	 or	
misleading	 actions	 by	 directors.195	 	 Some	 suggest	 that	 the	 system	 is	
generally	working.196			




deflate	value	 in	anticipation	of	 litigation.199	 	Expensive	“Directors	and	
 
	 192	 Michael	S.	Moore	&	Heidi	M.	Hurd,	Punishing	the	Awkward,	the	Stupid,	the	Weak,	
and	 the	 Selfish:	 The	 Culpability	 of	 Negligence,	 5	 CRIM.	 L.	 &	 PHIL.	 147,	 179	 (2011)		
[hereinafter	Culpability	of	Negligence].	
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of	 all	 securities	 class	 action	 lawsuits,	 twenty-four	 percent	were	 filed	
against	life	sciences	companies.201	
In	order	to	address	the	peculiar	situations	that	arise	with	public	life	
sciences	 companies,	 this	 Comment	 will	 now	 look	 at	 several	 narrow	
opportunities	 that	 may	 provide	 relief,	 deterrence,	 or	 encourage	
prevention,	with	an	eye	 toward	diminishing	 the	need	 for	 class	action	
securities	 lawsuits	 by	 prophylactically	 discouraging	 the	 harmful	
behavior.		It	is	important	to	note	that	even	as	the	industry	looks	to	make	
changes,	 the	 courts	 have	 been	 altering	 the	 burdens	 placed	 on	 both	
plaintiffs	 and	 defendants—and	 while	 there	 are	 certainly	 still	 fair	
protections	 for	 the	 defendants,	 as	 misrepresentations	 continue,	 the	
courts	respond	in	one	of	the	only	ways	they	can:	increasing	deterrence	
by	allowing	plaintiff	actions	to	progress	to	the	merits.202		
In	order	 to	apply	 the	 learnings	 from	above,	 it	 seems	essential	 to	
view	 potential	 solutions	 in	 relation	 to	 how	 they	 might	 disrupt	 the	
slippery	 slope	 of	 induction	 that	 allows	 for	 individuals	 and	 teams	 to	
neutralize	 their	 internal	 cognitive	 dissonance	 while	 remaining	
objectively	out	of	alignment	with	reality.	 	The	very	nature	of	 the	FDA	
approval	process	creates	incredible	opportunities	for	induction,	as	it	is	
replete	with	 incremental,	 short-step	changes.	 	Globally,	 solutions	 that	
encourage	managers	 to	confront	 these	changes	by	causing	disruption	
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of	 reliance,	 making	 the	 plaintiff’s	 case	 easier,	 it	 allows	 the	 defense	 to	 rebut	 the	
presumption	prior	to	class	action	certification.	 	See	 id.	at	277–79.	 	 In	Halliburton,	 the	
Court	held	that	requiring	a	plaintiff	to	prove	reliance	or	“price-impact”	created	too	high	
of	a	bar	for	class	action	securities	litigation	to	be	established.		See	id.	at	267–68,	278–79.			
The	 Second	 Circuit	 pushed	 to	 broaden	 potential	 plaintiffs	 through	 their	 expanded	











elicit	 positive	 behavior	 changes,	 as	 opposed	 to	 generating	 more	
bureaucracy.		
With	 that	 guiding	 principle	 in	 mind,	 the	 following	 sections	 will	
briefly	identify	a	few	possible,	narrow	paths	forward:	(1)	opportunities	
for	reformations	to	the	FDA	notifications	and	guidance;	(2)	mandating	
disclosures,	 under	 the	 SEA,	 of	 any	 FDA	 notifications;	 (3)	 creating	 a	




The	 FDA	 could	 deploy	 superior	 guidance	 relevant	 to	 its	
notifications	and	 the	SEA	at	 either	 a	 global	 level	or	with	a	piecemeal	
approach.		Fraud	or	Confusion	offers	up	a	version	of	FDA	reform	targeted	
at	globally	issued	guidance:	
The	 FDA	 must	 create	 comprehensive	 guidance	 that	
establishes	 and	 provides	 examples	 of	 best	 disclosure	
practices	 during	 the	 drug	 approval	 process.	 	 Such	 guidance	
would	help	companies	determine	how	the	FDA	will	respond	
to	 a	 fact,	which	 subsequently	 affects	 the	materiality	 of	 that	
fact.	 	 Ideally	 it	would	provide	 strategies	whereby	companies	









environmental	 elements	 are,	 the	 easier	 they	 become	 to	 distinguish	
because	 the	 ambiguity	 creates	 opportunities	 to	 reshape	 the	 facts.		
Therefore,	 providing	 clearer	 FDA	 guidance	 may	 serve	 to	 refine	 the	
resolution	of	information,	making	it	more	difficult	to	falsely	distinguish	
the	information.	
Alternatively,	 the	 second	 option	 requires	 an	 immense	
reapportionment	of	resources	on	the	part	of	the	FDA—this	seems	too	
much	to	ask,	given	budget	constraints.		But	perhaps	an	amalgamation	of	







(2)	 a	 simple	 color	 code	 for	 the	 severity	 of	 the	 issue,	 and	 (3)	 a	 clear	
timeline	 of	 events—perhaps	 simplified,	 specific	 example	 timelines—
then,	 in	 conjunction	 with	 the	 global	 guidance	 that	 explains	 these	
elements,	 the	 FDA	 could	 include	 specific	 color	 coding	 and	 timeline	
relationships	with	each	notice.		
In	 the	 context	 of	 ethical	 actors	 under	 the	 influence	 of	 cognitive	
dissonance,	 clear,	bold	warnings	 that	may	disrupt	 the	regular	 flow	of	
communication	could	serve	to	jar	the	actor	out	of	complacency.		
B.		Mandatory	FDA	Disclosures	Under	the	SEA	
Another	possible	path	 forward	 is	 to	mandate	FDA	disclosures.204		
This	would	work	by	requiring	every	company	to	disclose,	in	a	Form	8-
K,	the	action	letter	sent	by	the	FDA	within	a	period	of	time	(redactions	
of	 intellectual	 property	 would	 be	 permitted).205	 	 Deterring	 Fraud:	
Mandatory	Disclosure	 cites	 three	 potential	 criticisms	 of	 this	 plan:	 (1)	
concerns	with	protecting	proprietary	data;	(2)	“information	overload”	
for	 investors;	 and	 (3)	 concerns	 about	 the	market	 overreacting	 to	 the	
disclosure.206		These	may	be	valid	reasons	not	to	execute	this	plan,	but,	
assuming,	arguendo,	that	these	are	irrelevant,	this	solution	still	leaves	a	
glaring	 flaw:	 it	 assumes	 that	 the	 only	 material	 information	 is	
information	 sent	 to	 the	 company	by	 the	 FDA,	 and	not	messaging	 the	
company	sends	 to	 the	FDA.	 	As	 seen	above,	 these	action	 letters	often	
form	 a	 sort	 of	 “conversation”	 between	 the	 company	 and	 the	 FDA—









long	 way	 to	 eliminate	 potential	 sticky	 points	 for	 Section	 10(b)	
 













rendition	 of	 that	 communication,	 allowing	 for	 the	 removal	 of	 any	
intellectual	property	or	trade	secret.		If	the	company	has	complied,	then	
the	 burden	 is	 on	 the	 plaintiff	 to	 show	 that	 the	 company	 clearly	
misrepresented	 a	 fact—this	 would	 allow	 for	 significant	 protections	
against	potential	claims	of	material	omissions	under	Rule	10b-5,	should	
companies	 comply.	 	 If	 a	 company	has	not	 filed	 a	disclosure,	 then	 the	
burden	would	shift	back	to	the	company	to	show	why	a	disclosure	was	






without	 being	 fully	 aware	 of	 the	 misalignment.	 	 Still,	 this	 works	 to	
eliminate	 some	 bureaucracy,	 and	 potentially	 reduce	 the	 number	 of	
disclosures,	 versus	 the	 mandatory	 disclosure	 scheme,	 that	 would	
saturate	the	investors.		The	safe	harbor	aspect	of	this	approach	allows	
for	businesses	to,	in	a	healthy	way,	take	advantage	of	this	law	to	their	
own	 protection	 while	 still	 accomplishing	 the	 goal:	 deterring	
misrepresentations.	
D.		A	Special	Disclosure	Committee	
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reduces	 the	 burden	 on	 the	 court	 system	 by	 eliminating	 potentially	
frivolous	suits.209	
Fashioning	 a	 Special	 Disclosure	 Committee	 (“SDC”)	 could	 have	
clear	 benefits	 by	 empowering	 an	 impartial	 group	 to	 make	 final	
disclosure	decisions,	and,	due	to	their	impartiality,	offer	some	level	of	
subsequent	liability	insulation.	 	But	given	that	the	issues	here	revolve	
around	 securities	 class	 action	 litigation—direct	 actions	 by	
shareholders—and	 not	 derivative	 actions,	 there	 are	 some	 key	
differences,	and	thus,	clear	alterations	that	must	be	made	between	the	
SLC	model	and	a	theoretical	SDC.		For	instance,	an	SDC,	unlike	the	SLC,	
would	not	be	 capable	of	dismissing	 litigation—nor	 should	 it.210	 	 That	
being	 said,	 directors—and	 thus,	 Qualified	 Directors	 under	 the	Model	
Business	 Corporation	 Act	 (“MBCA”)211—would	 still	 have	 fiduciary	
duties	to	the	shareholders,	regardless	of	the	direct	action.212	 	The	end	
result	 would	 be	 to	 create	 an	 SDC	 that—similar	 to	 how	 an	 audit	
committee	 requires	 at	 least	 one	 expert	 in	 Generally	 Accepted	
Accounting	 Principles	 (“GAAP”)—might	 have	 at	 least	 one	 Qualified	
Director	with	a	legal	background—or	legal	compliance	certification—as	





The	 SDC	 would	 function	 by	 choosing	 the	 scope	 of	 disclosure	
concerning	 FDA	 notifications	 and	 company	 correspondence	with	 the	
FDA.		If	the	procedures	are	followed	correctly,	then	the	presumption—
rebuttable	 by	 plaintiff—in	 any	 dismissal	 motion	 or	 class	 action	


























with	 the	 problem,	 giving	 a	 more	 objective,	 third	 party	 a	 different	
vantage	point	to	see	the	disclosure	issues.		By	eliminating	some	of	the	
SDC’s	potential	conflicting	interests,	the	SDC’s	primary	motivation	will	
be	 to	 make	 the	 correct	 disclosure	 decision.	 	 This	 could	 add	 more	




the	 current	 FDA	 notification	 process	 and	 required	 SEA	 disclosure	
requirements	create	a	perfect	 storm	of	 circumstances	 that	encourage	
actors	 to	 obviate	 their	 cognitive	 dissonance	 by	 small,	 step-change	
induction,	which	allows	managers	to	detach	themselves	from	objective	
reality,	creating	material	omissions	and	misstatements	along	the	way.			
While	 cognitive	 dissonance	may	not	 preclude	 liability	 under	 the	
SEA,	 Section	10(b),	 it	 does	diminish	 the	potential	 for	 the	manager	 to	
foresee	potential	consequences	and	act	to	avoid	said	consequences	by	
positively	changing	their	behaviors.		Without	this	clear	view	to	causality,	
the	 theoretically	positive	 effect	of	deterrence	 is	diminished.	 	Offering	
businesses	 additional	 tools,	 such	 as	 the	 safe	 harbor	 of	 an	 SDC,	 or	 a	
presumptive	 disclosure	 scheme,	 may	 allow	 businesses	 to	 be	 more	
proactive	in	defending	these	matters.	 	Coordinating	FDA	notices	more	
closely	 with	 SEC	 disclosure	 requirements	 could	 help	 to	 jolt	 some	
managers	 from	 complacency.	 	 Without	 adjustments	 to	 the	 laws	
surrounding	 FDA	 notifications	 and	 the	 SEC	 disclosure	 requirements,	
small-capitalized	public	 life	science	sector	companies	will	continue	to	
breed	 opportunities	 for	 managers	 to,	 under	 the	 influence	 of	 falsely	
obtained	consonance,	misrepresent	and	omit	material	facts	to	investors	
without	fully	comprehending	their	conduct.	
	
